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ARGUMENT 
This matter concerns the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs1 fraud-based causes of action. 
Plaintiffs1 Second'Amended Complaint describes five major theaters of activity where fraudulent acts 
occurred, and includes thirty-five defendants who were involved in various inter-related frauds 
described in twenty-one causes of action. Plaintiffs allege what misrepresentations were made, 
who made them, when they were made and to whom they were made. Yet the trial court 
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of action, holding that because all of the specific 
facts from the general allegations section of the Second Amended Complaintwere not repeated in 
each specific cause of action for fraud, Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity. 
The trial court also dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud-based causes of action, on the basis that 
Ken Dolezsar ("Dolezsar") is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"). Despite Plaintiffs' allegations that Dolezsar was always 
acting as Leslie D. Mower's ("Leslie") agent and that Defendants made misrepresentations to 
Dolezsar, who they knew was acting as Leslie's agent, the trial court concluded Dolezsar was a 
necessary and indispensable party. 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of action without leave to amend, 
failing to give any reason for doing so, and without applying the required factors. The trial court 
further held that Utah does not recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty, nor a cause of action for aiding and abetting intentional torts generally. 
I. Plaintiffs Pled Fraud with Particularity 
A, The Trial Court Must Draw All Reasonable Inferences in Plaintiffs1 Favor 
The Simpson Defendants argue that when considering a motion to dismiss based on Rule 
9(b) URCP, a court does not need to draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 
- 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the plaintiff. Brief of Simpson Appellees ("Simpson Brieff) 19. However. In contrast, in 
Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 86, 69 P.3d 286, a case which addresses a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 9(b), the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "[ajfter viewing the factual allegations as true 
and considering them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most 
favorable to [plaintiffs], we conclude that (plaintiffs] have presented a cognizable claim for 
relief." Id. at % 25, see also Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity a court must read the complaint 
generously and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader); Armani v. Maxim Healthcare Services, 
Inc., 53 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1129-30 (D. Colo. 1999) (stating a dismissal of a claim for failing to 
satisfy Rule 9(b) is treated as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and all factual allegations must be 
accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleader). Contrary 
to the Simpson Defendants1 argument, when considering a motion to dismiss based on Rule 
9(b), a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
When the correct standard is applied, Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint clearly alleges fraud in 
accordance with the requirements of Rule 9(b) URCP. 
B. Plaintiffs Plead Their Fraud Based Claims in Conformance with Rule 9(b) 
Rule 9(b) URCP requires that all averments of fraud set forth the circumstances of the 
fraud with particularity.1 Particularity means a plaintiff must provide "sufficient particularity to 
show what facts are claimed to constitute the charges." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, \ 16,70 P.3d 35. A plaintiff must assert "the substance of the acts constituting the 
'The Simpson Defendants quote Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) as stating 
that a plaintiff must "allege with particularity facts necessary to make all elements of fraud," 
However, the Debry case does not make that statement. It simply states "Rule 9(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud claims be pled with particularity." Id. 
-2-
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alleged wrong." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). Importantly, a 
plaintiff who alleges the time of the alleged fraud, the persons involved and the facts and 
transactions underlying the fraud satisfies the requirements of Rule 9(b) URCP. See Dahl v. 
Gardner, 583 F.Supp. 1262, 1267 (D. Utah 1984). "[M]ore complex transactions require less 
specificity in pleading and, in these matters, the paragraphs of the complaint cannot be isolated 
but must be read as a whole." Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F.Supp. 406, 416 (D. Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). Here, the transactions at issue are just as complex, if not more so, than the 
transactions at issue in "Lochhead. There are multiple, inter-related frauds occurring over several 
years. 
The Simpson Defendants argue both that Plaintiffs did not provide enough detail and 
that they provided too much detail. They spend several pages of their brief describing how 
Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the "basic and fundamental requirement of clarity and conciseness." 
Simpson Brief 19. The Simpson Defendants complain that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
spans 361 pages and contains 1362 numbered paragraphs and therefore violates a requirement 
of clarity and conciseness. The Simpson Defendants further complain that Plaintiffs included 
unnecessary detail from credit card statements and other unhelpful "minutia" and that it 
"rambles on." Simpson Brief 22. 
However, in dismissing Plaintiffs fraud-based causes of action, the trial court never found 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint violates a standard of clarity and conciseness.2 Rec. 5606-
2In the trial court, the Simpson Defendants provided argument, reason and authority only 
as to why Plaintiffs fraud claims in relation to the MagnetBank loan, the non-disclosure action 
in relation to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase and the fraud allegations in relation to the 
Presidio Land and Water Deal failed to meet the particularity requirement. Rec. 5288-5263, 
5430-5407. Yet the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' fraud based claims after a "careful 
review of the memoranda and authorities submitted." Rec. 5605. Plaintiffs were never put on 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5602. Further, the trial court never held that the Second Amended Complaintwas filled with 
"minutia." Rec. 5605-5602. Furthermore, when the Simpson Defendants refer to "minutia," 
they refer to allegations about Plaintiffs1 claim for breach of fiduciary duties in relation to the 
Hawaii Condominium Development, claims neither dismissed by the trial court nor the subject 
of this appeal. Simpson Brief 22. 
Plaintiffs clearly and specifically allege the misrepresentations made by David Simpson, 
Nathan Simpson and others. Rec. 3177-3173, fflj 82-87; 3113-3110, fflf 256-260; 3094-3085, fflf 
309-319; 3075-3065, fflf 350-372; 3055-3052, ffl[ 404-417; 3048-3046, ffij 433-436; and 3033-
3032, Tffi 486-488. These allegations are incorporated into the specific causes of action for fraud. 
Rec. 3016, ffif 542-550; 3011, ffif 553 and 557; 3005, % 581; 2992, fflf 640-644; 2986, ffif 678-679; 
2977-2976, fflf 721-725; 2975-2970, fflf 739-755; 2951, If 833; 2926-2925, fflj 975-977; 2922-2911, 
flf 991-1001. Therefore, Plaintiffs' fraud allegations comport with the requirements of Rule 9(b) 
URCP. The Second Amended Complaint tells a very complicated legal story, and it does so with 
particularity and clarity. 
When a case involves complicated and inter-related facts and issues, trial courts are 
instructed not to apply Rule 9(b)fs requirements stringently. See Ijochhead, 697 F.Supp. at 416. 
Here, the trial court and the Simpson Defendants focus solely on specific paragraphs of the 
Second Amended Complaintin isolation, instead of reading the Second Amended Complaint us a whole. 
When read as a whole, the Second Amended Complaintclearly contains the "substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged wrong." Williams, 656 P.2d at 972. The Second Amended Complaint gives 
notice of a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations of fraud in relation to the other areas 
of The Preserve Development and Hawaii Development. Defendants therefore could not have 
carried their burden of convincing the trial court that Plaintiffs1 allegations were deficient. The 
trial court's decision should be reversed on that basis alone. 
-4-
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Defendants fair notice of Plaintiffs1 claims and the factual ground upon which they are based. 
See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, l24F3d 1246,1252 (10th Ck. \997). 
The Simpson Defendants argue, "similar to the complaint in Coroles, the Second 
Amended Complaint incorporates by reference all of the 536 paragraphs from the general factual 
statement into each of the fraud-based claims." Simpson Brief 22. In Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT 
App 339, 79 P.2d 974, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[t]he section of the complaint that is devoted to common law fraud consists of 
eleven paragraphs. The first of these paragraphs, paragraph 661 of the complaint, 
simply reads: fThe forgoing paragraphs numbered 1 -660 are incorporated into this 
Count1 The remaining ten paragraphs of this section merely recite the elements 
of fraud and allege the Defendants committed each element 
Id. at Tf 25. Here, unlike Coroles, Plaintiffs, in addition to incorporating all previous paragraphs 
of the Second Amended Complaint into each cause of action, Plaintiffs additionally make specific 
factual allegations within each fraud-based cause of action and incorporate specific and distinct 
paragraphs from the general allegations section of the Second Amended Complaint into each of the 
specific fraud-based causes of action. Defendants clearly were given notice of Plaintiffs1 claims 
against them.3 
The Simpson Defendants do not present any argument, reason or authority that 
contradicts Plaintiffs1 contentions that the trial court erred when it required all relevant facts to 
each fraud cause of action be contained within the fraud-based causes of action. The trial court 
was required to consider Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaintas a whole, which it failed to do. 
The trial court focused on individual paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint instead of 
considering the Second Amended Complaint as a whole. 
^The Simpson Defendants also disregard the fact that it is common practice in Utah's 
legal community to incorporate all the previous paragraphs into each cause of action. 
-5-
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G. Plaintiffs' Correctly Plead Causes of Action for Fraudulent Non-Disclosure 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraudulent non-disclosure causes of action for failure 
to meet the pleading standard of Rule 9(b) URCP. Rec. 5603. It did so for the reasons set forth 
by the Simpson Defendants. Rec. 5605. In the trial court, the Simpson Defendants argued 
Plaintiffs were required to plead reliance as part of their causes of action for fraudulent non-
disclosure. They rely on the unpublished opinion in Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. vFoiaini, 2008 UT App 
463 (unpublished opinion). Accepting the Simpson Defendant's argument would mean that the 
Utah Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, changed the long held pleading standard for 
fraudulent non-disclosure outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Ya^dv. Woodside Homes Corp., 
2006UT47,143P.3d283. 
The Ya%d court stated "[i]n order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a 
plaintiff must prove f(l) that the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to 
communicate.1" Id. at % 10 (quoting Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 8 0 , \ 10, 31 P.3d 572.4 The 
Utah Court of Appeals cited the same three elements in Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 
2010 UT App 361, f 20, 246 P.3d 131. The Utah Court of Appeals reference and approval of 
the three elements of fraudulent non-disclosure as set forth in Gilbert was after the Barber Bros. 
case. Further, as recendy as April 26, 2011, the Utah Supreme Court, citing Ya%d, stated the 
elements for a claim for fraudulent non-disclosure are "(1) the defendant had a legal duty to 
communicate information, (2) the defendant knewoi the information he failed to disclose, and 
4Ya%d was first heard by the Utah Court of Appeals which listed the same elements for 
a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure as the Utah Supreme Court listed when it heard the matter. 
See Ya^d v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, f 8,109 P.3d 393. 
-6-
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(3) the nondisclosed information was material" Hess v. Canberra Development Companyy LC, 2011 
UT 22, % 29 (emphasis in original). 
In their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed in 
the trial court, the Simpson Defendants admitted the Ya%d court did not list reliance as a 
required element of a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. Instead they argued reliance 
is "embodied" in the requirement that a plaintiff show the non-disclosed information is material 
Rec. 5411-5410. The Simpson Defendants make no argument that Plaintiffs failed to allege the 
elements for fraudulent non-disclosure as set forth in Ya%d. Defendants only argue that 
Plaintiffs failed to allege reliance, which is not required.5 In the Second Amended Complaint 
Plaintiffs allege all the required elements for fraudulent non-disclosure. Rec. 3005-3004, ^  580-
587;2952-2948,^832-854;2899,in|1075-1080;2889-2888,inill34-1138; 2882-2881,^1175-
1184. Plaintiffs meet the pleading standard for fraudulent non-disclosure as set forth in Ya^d 
and therefore the trial court erred by dismissing all of Plaintiffs1 causes of action for fraudulent 
non-disclosure. 
D. The Second Amended Complaint Gives Each Defendant Notice of the 
Fraud for Which They are Responsible 
The Simpson Defendants argue Plaintiffs impermissibly "lumped" together David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson in alleging fraud. Plaintiffs allege both David Simpson and 
Nathan Simpson made misrepresentations. Importantly, Plaintiffs allege all the Defendants 
5Importantly, in the trial court the Simpson Defendants only argued that Plaintiffs 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim in relation to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase failed to 
meet the pleading standard. They never offered any argument, reason or authority that Plaintiffs 
must allege reliance and they never addressed any of Plaintiffs' pleadings in that regard except 
the pleadings in relation to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase, yet the trial court dismissed 
all of Plaintiffs1 claims for fraudulent non-disclosure. 
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acted as part of a conspiracy. The Utah Court of Appeals stated that a person can be liable for 
fraud if "he made false representations himself, au tho red someone to make them for him or 
participated in die misrepresentations in some way, such as through conspiracy." Israel Vagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 792 (Ut. Ct App. 1987). Here, Plaintiffs clearly allege that both 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson made misrepresentations and that they did so as part of 
a conspiracy. 
When a plaintiff alleges that a group of defendants agreed to accomplish a fraudulent 
objective, "it is irrelevant whether all ... defendants participated in every alleged act. ... A 
complaint which alleges the manner in which a conspiracy to defraud is to be carried out and 
the role of the defendants in the conspiracy is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." 
luochhead, 697 F.Supp at 418. Here, Plaintiffs clearly alleged a group of defendants acted as part 
of a conspiracy, they clearly alleged the manner in which the conspiracy to defraud was carried 
out and the role of each Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). 
The Simpson Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs included both David Simpson and 
Nathan Simpson in one paragraph, they are impermissibly "lumping" them together. However, 
Plaintiffs1 allegations that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson made the misrepresentations 
certainly state the persons involved in the misrepresentations. See Dahl, 656 P.2d at 972. Plaintiffs 
give each Defendant notice of what they claim each Defendant did wrong by identifying the 
misrepresentations, the party or parties responsible for them, and when they were made. 
Plaintiffs1 factual allegations meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) URCP because they clearly set 
forth the substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrongs. 
-8-
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E. Plaintiffs Adequately Set Forth the Factual Bases Behind Allegations Made 
on Information and Belief 
The Simpson Defendants argue Plaintiffs did not include factual bases for allegations 
made on "information and belief." They point the Court to only one such alleged instance, 
paragraph 316 of the Second Amended Complaint Simpson Brief 27. Although Plaintiffs make 
allegations of misrepresentations based on information and belief, they set forth the facts upon 
which their information and belief was based. Paragraph 315 of the Second Amended Complaint 
clearly claims Dolezsar made representations to Leslie. Paragraph 316 then alleges, on 
information and belief, that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson first made those same 
representations to Dolezsar. Therefore, paragraph 315 sets forth the basis for the information 
and belief allegations in paragraph 316. The Simpson Defendants read each paragraph of the 
Second Amended Complaint in isolation, ignore all of the general allegations when reading the 
individual causes of action, and ignore all of the exhibits to the Second Amended Complaint, rather 
than reading the Second Amended Complaints a whole. They then claim Plaintiffs' allegations of 
fraud lack particularity and that Plaintiffs failed to include the basis for allegations made on 
information and belief. 
F. Plaintiffs Plead Specific Facts Regarding Defendant Aviano 
Defendant Michael Aviano ("Aviano") argues that "Plaintiffs also allege an 
unsubstantiated conclusion that the difference of $325,000.00 ($900,000.00 - $575,000.00 = 
$325,000.00) was paid to Plaintiffs by Mr. Simpson. Plaintiffs, however, provide no factual 
allegations in support of these speculative conclusions ...." Michael Aviano1 s Appellee Brief on 
Appeal (" Aviano Brief1) 16. Moreover, Aviano ignores his own Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-
Claim (Michael W. Aviano) in which he alleges: 
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[a]s part of a prior loan made by Mr. Aviano to Mr. Simpson, which is unrelated 
to the present law suit, Mr. Aviano and Mr. Simpson agreed that Mr. Aviano 
would pay $575,000.00 of the $900,000.00 sales price, and that Mr. Simpson 
would pay the remaining $325,000.00 of the $900,000.00 sales price. 
Rec. 5522, % 15. Further, Aviano alleges Leslie offered to repay Aviano the purchase price of 
the lot, $575,000.00. Rec. 5522, f 15; 5521-5520; fflf 21-22. Therefore, Aviano admits that he 
paid $575,000.00 for the lot, that the sales price was reported to MagnetBank as $900,000.00 and 
that the closing documents showed the sales price as $900,000.00. Aviano cannot now argue 
Plaintiffs1 claims are unsubstantiated when in the trial court he admitted they are true. Plaintiffs 
claims are anything but "unsubstantiated," Aviano has admitted they are true. 
Aviano further argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege any damages because the sales price was 
reported to be $900,000.00 and that MagnetBank received $900,000.00. However, Plaintiffs 
allege that if MagnetBank had known the true price Aviano had paid for the lot, it would have 
had reason to suspect the loan to The Preserve as well as the collateral for the loan were both 
in peril, and would have taken steps to protect the collateral and to collect the loan. Plaintiffs 
allege such steps would have included not allowing the sale to occur and calling the loan due. 
Rec. 2963, fflf 806-808. Because MagnetBank did not take steps to protect the loan and the 
collateral, the loan is unpaid and in default. Further, Aviano filed causes of action against 
Plaintiff Navona, IXC ("Navona"), MagnetBank's successor in interest, for Failure to Release 
Security Interest, Slander of Tide, Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Unjust Enrichment Rec. 5517-5505. If MagnetBank had 
known the true facts regarding the price truly paid by Aviano for the lot, it would not have 
approved the sale and none of these causes of action, which Plaintiff Navona is now forced to 
defend, would have occurred. 
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II. Dolezsar is Not a Necessary and Indispensable Party 
A* Plaintiffs Allege That Dolezsar Was Acting as Leslie's Agent at All Times 
The Simpson Defendants argue the trial court was correct in determining that Dolezsar 
was both a necessary and indispensable party, finding that Dolezsar "occupied a pivotal 
representative role." Simpson Brief 34. The Simpson Defendants emphasize Plaintiffs never 
allege that any of the Defendants made any representations directly to Leslie. However, 
Plaintiffs' core allegation is that at all times Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent. Under Utah's 
law of agency, when Defendants made misrepresentations to Dolezsar, they were making them 
to Leslie. See Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne^ 2006 UT 22, \ 27,134 P.3d 1122; see also 
3 Am Jur 2d Agency § 287. 
Defendants and the trial court focused on Plaintiffs' allegations that Dolezsar repeated 
Defendants' misrepresentations to Leslie, rather than focusing on Plaintiffs' allegations that 
Defendants first made the misrepresentations to Dolezsar. Plaintiffs allege: (1) Defendants knew 
Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent when they made misrepresentations to him, and (2) 
Defendants authorized and encouraged Dolezsar to repeat their misrepresentations to Leslie. 
Rec. 3016, ffll 542-543; 2978, \ 719-720; 2975, \ 731; 2974, \ 734; 2973, \ 739. 
The Simpson Defendants admit the general rule is that agents are not typically necessary 
parties to lawsuits against their principals, yet they fail to distinguish why this matter is different. 
Defendants reason the trial court did not conclude Dolezsar was indispensable because he was 
Leslie's agent, but because it was he who communicated the misrepresentations to Leslie. 
However, Dolezsar's communication of the misrepresentations to Leslie as her agent does not 
make him a necessary and indispensable party. Utah law holds that when the misrepresentations 
were made to Dolezsar, Leslie's agent, they were made to Leslie. See Swan Creek Village 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Homeowners, 2006 UT 22 at % 27. 
The Simpson Defendants also argue Dolezsar is a necessary and indispensable party 
because Defendants risk incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. 
However, the Simpson Defendants completely fail to describe how they are at risk. 
The Simpson Defendants further argue that Dolezsar is necessary and indispensable 
because the parties cannot question him regarding the misrepresentations and that "presumably 
Plaintiffs would rely on hearsay statements from Dolezsar and such statements are 
inadmissable." Simpson Brief 40. Whether Plaintiffs may later encounter evidentiary issues is 
not a proper consideration for finding that Dolezsar is a necessary and indispensable party, and 
is not one of the factors listed in Rule 19 URCP. Although the Simpson Defendants assert they 
will be prejudiced by not having the opportunity to question Dolezsar, they fail to explain how 
or why they will suffer prejudice. The trial court found Defendants would suffer prejudice only 
because of their inability to cross-claim against Dolezsar. It never addressed the inability to 
question him. Rec. 5593. 
B. Dolezsar Is Not Necessary and Indispensable Because Defendants Cannot 
Bring a Cross Claim Against Him 
The Simpson Defendants argue the trial court found Dolezsar was indispensable not 
because he was a joint tortfeasor against whom Defendants cannot bring a cross-claim, but 
rather because he occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud. When applying the 
factors to determine if Dolezsar is an indispensable party, the trial court found Defendants 
would be "unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in the absence of Dolezsar because of... 
their inability to cross claim against him." Rec. 5593. The trial court further concluded, "any 
judgment rendered without Mr. Dolezsar would be inadequate because ... no cross claims can 
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now be brought against his estate." Rec. 5593. The trial court found Doleszar was an 
indispensable party not because he occupied a "pivotal representative role" but rather because 
Defendants could not bring a cross-claim against him. 
The trial court's conclusion that Dolezsar is indispensable because he was the one who 
repeated the misrepresentations to Leslie ignores Plaintiffs1 allegations that Dolezsar was acting 
as Leslie's agent. It also ignores Plaintiffs' key allegation that the Defendants' misrepresentations 
did not originate with Dolezsar. 
The Simpson Defendants argue Dolezsar is just like Mr. Clark in the case of Turville v. 
]&] Properties, JLC, 2006 UT App 305, ffl[ 2-4 ,145 P.3d 1146. In Turville, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found Mr. Clark occupied a pivotal representative role. Mr. Clark did so because he 
initiated the misrepresentations and he alone benefitted from his misrepresentations. This 
matter is entirely different In Turville, the only person who made misrepresentations was Mr. 
Clark. Mr. Clark told others he owned the real property and could sell i t Mr. Clark titled the 
real property in his own name. See Id. Here, Defendants made the misrepresentations to 
Dolezsar, knowing he was acting as Leslie's agent. Defendants made the misrepresentations and 
benefitted from them, not Dolezsar. 
The Simpson Defendants argue the Turville court found that Mr. Clark's Estate was an 
indispensable party because Mr. Clark was the major actor responsible for the plaintiffs' 
damages. They also argue that because "plaintiffs were responsible for Clark's absence because 
they failed to join the estate within the limitations period after Clark's death." The Simpson 
Defendants refer the Court to paragraph 42 of the Turville opinion to support their argument 
Simpson Brief 38. However, while the Turville court held Mr. Clark was the sole actor 
responsible for the plaintiffs' damages, it never held Mr. Clark was an indispensable party 
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because plaintiffs failed to join the estate within the limitations period. See Id. at \ 42. The 
Turville court found Mr. Clark's Estate was an indispensable party because Mr. Clark was "the 
major, if not the sole, actor responsible for Plaintiffs damages." Id. Here, David Simpson and 
Nathan Simpson were the major actors responsible for Plaintiffs1 damages, as was Mr. Clark in 
Turville, because the misrepresentations originated with them, not with Dolezsar. 
The Simpson Defendants also ignore the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78B-5-
821(2) which states, "[a] person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, but fault 
may be allocated to a person immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining 
the fault of the person seeking recovery and all defendants." Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-
821 (2). Defendants have the option to ask the trial court to allocate fault pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78B--5-821(2). See Utah Code Annotated §78B-5-821(4). The inability to join 
Dolezsar's estate has no effect on such a claim. 
The Simpson Defendants admit the general rule is that the inability to join joint 
tortfeasors or co-conspirators does not make them indispensable parties. See Pasco Int'/Ltd. v. 
Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 501 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980); Nottingham v. General American 
Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, fflf 
33-34,989 P.2d 61). The Simpson Defendants state, without any supporting authority, that the 
general rule does not apply in this case. Further, the trial court failed to state any reason for not 
applying the general rule. The trial court cannot conclude Dolezsar is necessary and 
indispensable for the sole reason that Defendants are unable to bring a cross-claim against him. 
The trial court cited no authority or facts allowing it to ignore the general rule. 
The Simpson Defendants argue they would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed 
without Dolezsar because the parties in this case cannot question him. They argue Plaintiffs will 
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rely on hearsay statements from Dolezsar and any such statements could not be considered by 
the trial court. Simpson Brief 40. Whether Defendants can question Dolezsar is unrelated to 
whether he is necessary and indispensable. The trial court never found Dolezsar was necessary 
and indispensable because Defendants cannot question him. Any proof issues Plaintiffs may 
encounter are speculative and are inappropriate considerations in deciding a Rule 19 motion. 
III. The Trial Court Improperly Dismissed Plaintiffs1 Claims Fraud-Based Causes of 
Action Without Leave to Amend 
The Simpson Defendants argue the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs1 claims 
without leave to amend, claiming that Plaintiffs had repeated failures to cure the deficiencies by 
amendments previously allowed.6 The Simpson Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to 
properly plead fraud despite at least three attempts at doing so. Simpson Brief 44. Such 
argument ignores the actual procedural history of this matter. 
After Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, they realized they did not include several 
causes of action. Before they could amend the original complaint, two defendants filed motions 
to dismiss.7 Plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding two causes of action. Plaintiffs made no 
other changes and did not make any changes to address any alleged pleading deficiencies. 
'The trial court committed error when it dismissed the Second Amended Complaintwithout 
leave to amend and when it failed to indicate that the dismissal was without prejudice. A 
complaint dismissed upon the inadequacy of the pleadings must be dismissed without prejudice. 
See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, % 47,79 P.3d 974. The trial court did not specify dismissal 
was without prejudice. Rule 41 URCP states a dismissal operates as an adjudication on the 
merits unless the court states otherwise, the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue 
or lack of an indispensable party. By failing to indicate dismissal was without prejudice, the trial 
court's dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits making it impossible for Plaintiffs to 
refile a complaint. 
7Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint as a matter of right because a motion to 
dismiss is not a responsive pleading that preempts a plaintiffs right to file an amended 
complaint. 
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Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint va response to the trial court's finding that they failed 
to plead fraud with particularity in their First Amended Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not 
had many opportunities to amend as argued by Defendants. In response to arguments that 
Plaintiffs, failed to allege fraud with particularity, Plaintiffs have amended only once. 
Further, the Simpson Defendants incorrectly argue that because Plaintiffs1 did not make 
a motion to amend to the trial court, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal without 
leave to amend. Such an argument ignores that the trial court specifically dismissed the Second 
Amended Complaint without leave to amend. By specifically dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based 
causes of action without leave to amend, the trial court made it clear that a motion to amend 
would be futile. 
The Simpson Defendants fail to address Plaintiffs' argument that the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to give any reasons for dismissing the Second Amended Complaintwithout 
leave to amend and by failing to apply any of the required factors in considering a motion to 
amend. In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), 
the trial court denied a motion to amend a complaint in a minute entry by simply stating "the 
motion to Amend the Complaint is denied." Id. at 1281. The trial court in Aurora Credit Services 
did not offer any explanation for the denial. See Id. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting the 
United States Supreme Court, stated, "outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any 
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely an abuse 
of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id. (quoting Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962). The trial court in this matter did the same. The Aurora court 
quoted the Idaho Supreme Court with approval when it stated, "a district court's refusal to grant 
leave to amend without any justifying reason is, per se, an abuse of discretion." Id. at 1281 
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(quoting Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 912 P.2d 
644, 652 (1996). Similarly the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs1 fraud-based causes of action 
without leave to amend is, per se, an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Plaintiffs1 fraud-based causes of action 
specifically without leave to amend because it did not give Plaintiffs the opportunity to make a 
motion to amend and it failed to consider any of the required factors. The Simpson Defendants 
fail to show the trial court considered any of the required factors when it dismissed Plaintiffs1 
fraud based claims without leave to amend. The trial court's order clearly demonstrates that the 
trial court never considered the required factors. Rec. 5606-5602. The trial court's failure to 
apply the required factors, or to give any basis at all for its dismissal without leave to amend, is 
an abuse of discretion. 
Defendant Aviano argues any amendment would be untimely and that Plaintiffs have had 
four chances to amend the complaint.8 As shown above, Plaintiffs have amended their 
complaint only one time in response to arguments that fraud was not pled with particularity. A 
trial court is to use its discretion in "the furtherance of justice and [it] must not be exercised so 
as to defeat justice. The rule in this state has always been to allow amendments freely where 
justice requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045,1046 
(Utah 1971). Here, only three of thirty-five (35) Defendants have filed an answer and there has 
been no discovery. Therefore, any amendment would be timely. 
8Aviano argues the Errata to Second Amended Complaint constitutes an amendment to the 
complaint. Such is not the case. The Errata to Second Amended Complaint simply attempted to 
clarify the captions to the various causes of action to specify the correct defendants named in 
the causes of action. No substantive changes were made to the allegations in the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
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In decidbg a motion to amend, a trial court "should primarily consider whether granting 
the motion would subject the opposing party to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which it had not had time to prepare." Aurora Credit Services, Inc., 970 P.2d at 
1282. Although there are several factors a trial court may consider, prejudice is the primary 
consideration. Aviano argues he would suffer prejudice because he would "necessarily expend 
a substantial amount of time, resources, and attorneys fees in responding to Plaintiffs inadequate 
pleadings." Aviano Brief 20. He also argues he would be "forced to conduct his life and his 
business under die constant stigma of being named as a defendant in a seemingly never-ending 
lawsuit" Aviano Brief 20. However, such factors, even if true, are not the proper factors in 
considering prejudice. 
A showing of simple prejudice is not enough to support a denial of a motion to amend.9 
"|T]he Utah Supreme Court indicated that amendment should be denied only where the 
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated^/* which he had 
not time to prepare. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44 % 31, 87 P.3d 734 (quoting 
Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992) (emphasis in original). The Kelly court 
went on to state, "[tjhus, in order to justify the denial of a motion to amend on prejudice 
grounds, the prejudice must be undue or substantial prejudice, since almost every amendment 
of a pleading will result in some practical prejudice to the opposing party. Mere inconvenience 
to the opposing party is #0/grounds to deny a motion to amend." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Here, the trial court did not give any reasons for dismissing Plaintiffsf fraud-based causes 
of action without leave to amend, it failed to explain how any Defendant would not be able to 
9No matter the outcome of this appeal, Aviano will still be a defendant because the trial 
court did not dismiss all claims against him. 
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respond to any amendments and it did not explain how any Defendant would suffer the type of 
prejudice required to deny amendment Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing Plaintiffs1 claims without leave to amend. 
IV. Utah Recognizes Claims for Aiding and Abetting 
Defendants fail to offer any argument as to why this Court should not join the majority 
of jurisdictions and recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting. The Simpson 
Defendants simply argue that recognizing a new cause of action is not necessary. 
Utah courts recognize the tort of breach of fiduciary duty found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 874. In d'Elia v. Rice Development, Inc., 2006 UT App 416, \ 36,147 P.3d 515, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that Utah recognized the Restatement (Second) Torts § 874, 
which deals with breach of fiduciary duty. Comment c of Section 874 of the Restatement 
(Second) Torts recognizes the tort of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. It states that 
a "person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of 
tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused." Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 874, comment c. By recognizing the validity of the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 874, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
Recognizing the liability of a person who acts in concert with others is a logical extension 
of recognizing the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 874. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that 
because Colorado had adopted Restatement (Second) Torts § 874 which recognizes a person 
who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious 
conduct, it would recognize Restatement (Second) Torts, § 876 and recognize aiding and 
abetting causes of action generally. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305,308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
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The Simpson Defendants argue Utah plaintiffs should be limited to causes of action for 
conspiracy, unlike the majority of other jurisdictions in the United States. However, a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting and a cause of action for conspiracy have different elements. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained: 
civil conspiracy includes: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to 
participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury 
caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement; 
(4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common 
scheme. 
Halberstam v. Bernard, 705 R2d 472, 477 (D.C Cir. 1983). The Halberstam court went on to 
explain, "the element of agreement is a key distinguishing factor for a civil conspiracy action. 
Proof of tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is sufficient to show agreement Id. The 
elements for civil conspiracy are similar in Utah. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 
790 (Ut Ct. App 1087). 
The Halberstam court listed the elements for aiding and abetting as: 
(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes 
injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall 
illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the 
defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (citations omitted). The Halberstam court went on to note the "prime 
distinction between civil conspiracies and aiding-abetting is that a conspiracy involves an 
agreement to participate in a wrongful activity. Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant 
knowingly gave substantial assistance to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not 
whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct." Id. at 478. 
In speaking of the reason for recognizing aiding and abetting causes of action generally, 
the Restatement (Second) Torts, states: 
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[ajdvice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and 
if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon liability 
of the adviser as participation or physical assistance. If encouragement or 
assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is 
himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's ac t— 
The rule applies whether or not the other knows his act is tortious. 
Restatement (Second) Torts, § 876, comment on clause b. Recognizing a cause of action for 
aiding and abetting allows courts to hold parties liable for their acts when a defendant has given 
a tortfeasor substantial assistance but has not explicidy agreed to join the wrongful conduct. See 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478. 
Defendants argue Utah need not recognize a "new" cause of action. However, this cause 
of action is not new. It is recognized in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. 
Commentators have "perceived a trend toward increased recognition" of aiding and abetting 
torts." Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 The Business Lawyer 1135, 
1140 (2006). Therefore, this Court should confirm Utah has already recognized a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and should recognize torts for aiding and 
abetting generally, as set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts, § 876. 
Defendants also argue that even if Utah recognizes a cause of action for aiding and 
abetting fraudulent non-disclosure, Plaintiffs* did not plead fraudulent non-disclosure with 
particularity. Such an argument necessarily relies on the faulty conclusion that "reliance" must 
be pled as part of a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. There is no requirement for 
Plaintiffs5 to plead reliance as part of a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs plead their fraud allegations with particularity* When the Second Amended 
Complaint is read as a whole, instead of focusing on isolated paragraphs, it tells the story of 
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several inter-related and complicated fraudulent transactions. The trial court failed to read the 
Second Amended Complaint as a whole and instead required that all fraud related allegations be 
contained in the specific causes of action. It committed error when it did so. 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaintclearly gives each of the Defendants notice of what 
they are charged with so that they can prepare a response. Plaintiffs sufficiently describe the 
misrepresentations made, who made them, when they were made and the circumstances 
surrounding them. Therefore, dismissing all of Plaintiffs' fraud-based causes of action in the 
Second Amended Complaintwas error. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found Dolezsar is a necessary and 
indispensable party. The misrepresentations originated with the Defendants, not Dolezsar. 
Because Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent, when Defendants made misrepresentations to 
him, they made them to Leslie. Further, the trial court found Dolezsar is an indispensable party 
solely because Defendants cannot bring a cross-claim against his estate. The inability to bring 
a cross-claim against Dolezsar does not make him an indispensable party. 
Further, the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud based 
causes of action without leave to amend. The trial court failed to explain the reasons it 
dismissed the fraud-based causes of action without leave to amend and it never applied any of 
the required factors in considering a motion to dismiss. Given the trial court's order, it would 
have been futile for Plaintiffs to have filed a motion to amend. 
Lastly, the trial court erred when it dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and 
abetting. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Utah has recognized a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting breach of fiduciary duties. The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have 
recognized causes of action for aiding and abetting tortious acts generally, as described in the 
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Restatement (Second) Torts, § 876. Finally, it is a logical extension to recognize general causes 
of action for aiding and abetting after recognizing causes of action for aiding and abetting 
breaches of fiduciary duties. 
Therefore, this Court should find that (1) the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs1 
fraud based claims for lack of pleading with particularity; (2) the trial court abused its discretion 
in finding that Dolezsar was a necessary and indispensable party; (3) the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs1 fraud based claims without leave to amend; and (4) Utah 
recognizes causes of action for aiding and abetting. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011. 
BAILEY & JENNINGS, LC 
Bart J. Bailey 
William T. Jennings 
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The Defendant, Michael W. Aviano ("Mr. Aviano") by and through his counsel of 
record, HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C, answers Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
In answer to the specific paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. 
Aviano answers as follows: 
1. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 - 2 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
2. Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 3 - 22 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
3. Mr. Aviano admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint. 
4. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 24 - 403 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 24 - 403 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 24 - 403 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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therefore, denies the same. 
5. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 404 of Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano admits that David Simpson solicited a $2,000,000.00 loan 
from Mr. Aviano. Mr. Aviano denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 404 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. 
6. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 405 of Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint, as well as each Subparagraph thereto, Mr. Aviano admits that he agreed to 
lend David Simpson $2,000,000.00 for a period of one year, and that said loan was secured by a 
$2,000,000.00 Deed of Trust on David Simpson's personal residence. Mr. Aviano denies all 
other allegations contained in Paragraph 405 of Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint. 
7. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 406 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 406 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 406 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
8. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 407 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 407 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 407 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Moreover, any document or documents referenced in Paragraph 407 of Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint speak for themselves. 
9. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 408 of Plaintiffs' Second Ajnended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 408 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 408 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
10. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. Mr. 
Aviano denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 409 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. 
11. Mr. Aviano admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 410 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. Mr. Aviano also affirmatively states MagnetBank should have 
released its security interest in Lot 67 as MagnetBank had previously agreed to do. 
12. Mr. Aviano admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 411 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, any document or documents referenced in Paragraph 
411 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint speak for themselves. 
13. Mr. Aviano admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 412 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, any document or documents referenced in Paragraph 
412 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint speak for themselves. 
14. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 413 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint as such allegations constitute legal conclusions. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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15. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 414 - 793 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 414 - 793 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient infomiation to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 414 - 793 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
16. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 794 - 812 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint, comprising Plaintiffs' Eleventh Cause of Action for Fraud and 
Intentional Misrepresentation against Mr. Aviano, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that said cause 
of action was dismissed as against Mr. Aviano without leave to amend. Consequently, no 
answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that Mr. Aviano 
is required to provide an answer to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 794 - 812 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the same. 
17. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 813 - 826 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 813 - 826 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 813 - 826 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
18. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 827 - 830 of Plaintiffs' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Second Amended Complaint, comprising Plaintiffs' Thirteenth Cause of Action for Aiding and 
Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Mr. Aviano, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that said 
cause of action was dismissed as against Mr. Aviano without leave to amend. Consequently, no 
answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that Mr. Aviano 
is required to provide an answer to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 827 - 830 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the same. 
19. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 831 - 855 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 831 - 855 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 831 - 855 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
20. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 856 - 859 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint, comprising Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Cause of Action for Aiding and 
Abetting Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Mr. Aviano, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that 
said cause of action was dismissed as against Mr. Aviano without leave to amend. 
Consequently, no answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the 
extent that Mr. Aviano is required to provide an answer to the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 856 - 859 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the same. 
21. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 860 - 937 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 860 - 937 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 860 - 937 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
22. Mr. Aviano admits that The Preserve sold Lot 67 to Mr. Aviano in December 
2007. Mr. Aviano denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 938 of Plaintiff s Second 
Amended Complaint. 
23. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 939 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 939 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 939 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
24. Mr. Aviano admits that he made a $2,000,000.00 loan to David Simpson. Mr. 
Aviano denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 940 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. 
25. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 941 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 941 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Paragraph 941 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
26. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that any document or documents referenced in 
Paragraph 942 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint speak for themselves. Mr. Aviano 
denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 942 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. 
27. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 943 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
28. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 944 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
29. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 945 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 945 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 945 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
30. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 946 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 946 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 946 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. Mr. 
Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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31. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. With 
respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 947 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 947 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 947 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 947 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
32. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 948 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 948 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the 
allegations contained in Paragraph 948 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as such 
allegations constitute legal conclusions. 
33. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 949 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 949 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the 
allegations contained in Paragraph 949 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as such 
allegations constitute legal conclusions. 
34. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. With 
respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 950 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
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Complaint, Mr. Aviano affinnatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 950 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 950 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 950 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
35. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. With 
respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 951 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 951 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 951 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the 
same. 
36. Mr,, Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. With 
respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 952 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the same. 
37. Mr. Aviano affinnatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. With 
respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 953 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the same. 
38. With respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 954 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are 
levied against him in Paragraph 954 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no 
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answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any 
allegation is levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 954 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without sufficient inforaiation to form a belief as to the truth or falsity 
of the allegations contained in Paragraph 954 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
39. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 955 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
40. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 956 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
41. With respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 957 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are 
levied against him in Paragraph 957 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no 
answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any 
allegation is levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 957 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity 
of the allegations contained in Paragraph 957 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
42. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 958 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
43. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 959 - 976 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
». ^ 1 f l 
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levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 959 - 976 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient infonnation to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 959 - 976 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
44. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 977 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
45. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 978 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
46. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 979 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
47. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 980 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
48. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 981 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
49. With respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 982 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are 
levied against him in Paragraph 982 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no 
answer is required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any 
allegation is levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 982 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity 
of the allegations contained in Paragraph 982 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
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50. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 983 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
51. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 984 - 997 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 984 - 997 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient inforaiation to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 984 - 997 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
52. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 998 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 998 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the 
same. 
53. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 999 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required of 
Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 999 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano denies the 
same. 
54. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that the purchase price was $900,000.00. Mr. 
Aviano denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 1000 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 1001 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required 
of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 1001 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 1001 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
56. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 1002 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required 
of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 1002 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 1002 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
57. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 1003 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
58. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 1004 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
59. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraph 1005 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is required 
of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is levied against 
Mr. Aviano in Paragraph 1005 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Aviano is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 1005 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
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60. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 1006 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
61. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 1007 - 1215 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 1007 - 1215 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient infomiation to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 1007 - 1215 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
62. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 1216 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
63. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 1217 - 1230 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 1217 - 1230 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 1217 - 1230 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
64. Mr. Aviano denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 1231 of Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
65. Mr. Aviano affirmatively states that no allegations are levied against him in 
Paragraphs 1232 - 1310 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, therefore, no answer is 
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required of Mr. Aviano with respect to said allegations. To the extent that any allegation is 
levied against Mr. Aviano in Paragraphs 1232 - 1310 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, 
Mr. Aviano is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 1232 - 1310 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Mr. Aviano hereby affirmatively denies all allegations not expressly admitted herein. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Mr. Aviano hereby asserts the affirmative defenses sets forth in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil procedure inasmuch as any such defense is applicable, namely, accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver, as well 
as any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Mr. Aviano hereby asserts the defenses set forth in Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
procedure inasmuch as any such defense is applicable, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the Plaintiff herein, improper venue, insufficiency of 
process, insufficiency of service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, failure to join an indispensible party, and any other defense set forth in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which would be applicable to this matter. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
* - 55 
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Mr. Aviano hereby assert the defenses set forth in Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
procedure inasmuch as any such defense is applicable, including, but not limited to, failure to 
plead fraud, mistake, and conditions of the mind with particularity. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Plaintiffs' own unclean hands, as well as Plaintiffs' own 
material breaches of contract, if any, Plaintiffs' failure to mitigate damages, if any, and by the 
economic loss doctrine. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have no standing to assert any of the claims 
contained in its Complaint, nor is Plaintiff a real party in interest with respect to any claims 
contained within its Complaint. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Mr. Aviano may have claims against other parties or persons and hereby reserves the 
right to bring said claims against the same. Moreover, there may be further and additional 
affirmative defenses which are not yet known to Mr. Aviano, but which may become known 
through discovery. Mr. Aviano, therefore, reserves each and every affirmative defense as it may 
be ascertained through discovery herein. Furthermore, Mr. Aviano hereby incorporate all other 
affirmative defenses that may be alleged by any other parties to this lawsuit, or any individual or 
entity which may become a party hereto, to the extent that said affirmative defenses do not create 
liability for or waive rights enjoyed by Mr. Aviano. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Mr. 
Aviano demands that said Second Amended Complaint be dismissed as against him, and that Mr. 
Aviano be awarded his costs and attorneys' fees incurred in answering Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
-. 55 
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COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM 
The Defendant, Michael W. Aviano ("Mr. Aviano"), for cause of action against the 
Plaintiffs, Navona, LC ("Navona") and Leslie D. Mower ("Ms. Mower"), and against the 
Defendants, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC ("The Preserve") and David 
Simpson ("Mr. Simpson"), pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13, asserts, alleges, and complains as 
follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. The Counterclaimant, Mr. Aviano, is an individual and resident of Utah County, 
Utah. 
2. The Counterclaim Defendant, Ms. Mower, is also an individual and resident of 
Utah County, Utah. See, Second Amended Complaint, \3. 
3. The Counterclaim Defendant, Navona, is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Utah County, Utah, and was and is, at all relevant times, a 
successor-in-interest of MagnetBank, collectively "MagnetBank/Navona." See, Second 
Amended Complaint, ^ 7 . 
4. The Cross-Claim Defendant, Mr. Simpson, is an individual and resident of Utah 
County, Utah. 
5. The Cross-Claim Defendant, The Preserve, is a Utah limited liability company 
with its principal place of business in Utah County, Utah. 
6. John Does 1-10 are other individuals or entities which may also be liable to Mr. 
Aviano and who are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
7. The amount claimed is more than $20,000.00, exclusive of costs. 
* ZZO1 
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8. The obligations giving rise to Mr. Aviano's allegations and causes of action were 
executed and performable in writing in Utah County, Utah. 
9. In addition, the basis for Mr. Aviano's allegations and causes of action involve 
real property which is situated in Utah County, Utah. 
10. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-5-102. 
11. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-301, 78B-3-
304, and 78B-3-307, in addition to Utah R. Civ. P. 13. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
12. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
13. On or about December 6, 2007, Mr. Aviano, as Trustee of the Michael W. Aviano 
Trust, purchased a certain parcel of real property, commonly referred to as Lot 67 of Plat A of 
The Preserve at Mapleton subdivision ("Lot 67"), from The Preserve, with the intent to build his 
home thereon. See, Warranty Deed, attached to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as 
Exhibit 145. 
14. David Simpson, acting as an authorized agent for The Preserve, agreed to sell Mr. 
Aviano Lot 67 for the amount of $900,000.00. 
15. As part of a prior loan made by Mr. Aviano to Mr. Simpson, which is unrelated to 
the present law suit, Mr. Aviano and Mr. Simpson agreed that Mr. Aviano would pay 
$575,000.00 of the $900,000.00 sales price, and that Mr. Simpson would pay the remaining 
$325,000.00 of the $900,000.00 sales price. 
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16. Pursuant to the agreement for the sale and purchase of Lot 67, the entity holding 
the first mortgage on the property, MagnetBank (of which Navona is the applicable successor-in-
interest), agreed to release its security interest in Lot 67 upon the receipt of $897,773.00. See, 
Settlement Statement, attached as Exhibit 143 to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. See 
also, Approval Letter from MagnetBank, attached hereto as Exhibit "A " and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
17. Subsequently, MagnetBank/Navona received $897,773.00, as represented 
pursuant to the above-referenced Settlement Statement. See, Id. See also, Second Amended 
Complaint, % 410; and Standard Wire Transfer Request Form, attached hereto as Exhibit <lB" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
18. Notwithstanding the fact that MagnetBank/Navona received $897,773.00 from the 
proceeds of the sale of Lot 67, MagnetBank/Navona refuses to release its security interest in Lot 
67. See, Second Amended Complaint, \410. 
19. On or about April 14, 2009, Mr. Aviano, through his legal counsel, sent a letter to 
the Counterclaim Defendants, demanding the release of MagnetBank/Navona's security interest 
in Lot 67. See, Letter dated April 14, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
20. MagnetBank/Navona still refuses to release its security interest in Lot 67. 
21. In addition to the foregoing, Ms. Mower met with Mr. Aviano on at least five (5) 
separate occasions and personally offered to repay Mr. Aviano for any money which he paid 
towards the purchase price of Lot 67, as well as any other costs or fees subsequently incurred by 
Mr. Aviano with respect to Lot 67 in exchange for Mr. Aviano's agreement not to require 
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MagnetBank/Navona to release its security interest in Lot 67 and Mr. Aviano's agreement to 
postpone any further improvements of Lot 67. 
22. Mr. Aviano accepted Ms. Mower's offer to repay the $575,000.00, as well as 
subsequently incurred costs as set forth in Paragraphs 33 and 37, below, instead of requiring 
MagnetBank/Navona to release its security interest in Lot 67. 
23. Ms. Mower never repaid any portion of the purchase price paid by Mr. Aviano 
towards the purchase of Lot 67, nor did Ms. Mower repay any subsequently incurred costs as set 
forth in Paragraphs 33 and 37, below. 
24. Additionally, Navona's counsel also met with Mr. Aviano and offered, on behalf 
of his client, to repay Mr. Aviano any amount which Mr. Aviano had personally paid towards the 
purchase of Lot 67 within a few weeks, instead of requiring MagnetBank/Navona to release its 
security interest in Lot 67 and Mr. Aviano's agreement to postpone any further improvements of 
Lot 67. 
25. Mr. Aviano accepted Navona's offer to repay the $575,000.00 which Mr. Aviano 
had personally paid towards the purchase of Lot 67, instead of requiring MagnetBank/Navona to 
release its security interest in Lot 67. 
26. The Counterclaim Defendant never repaid any portion of the purchase price paid 
by Mr. Aviano towards the purchase of Lot 67. 
27. In addition to the foregoing, and in connection with the sale and purchase of Lot 
57, on or about December 5, 2007, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve specifically represented to 
Vlr. Aviano that all of the necessary preliminary work had been completed with respect to Lot 67 
md its subdivision, such that the City had approved the entire subdivision, including Lot 67, for 
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building and construction, and that Mr. Aviano would be able to immediately obtain the requisite 
building permit and commence construction immediately after purchasing the lot. 
28. In fact, however, the subdivision, including Lot 67, had not been approved for 
building or construction by the City of Mapleton. 
29. At the time Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made these representations with 
respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve knew that the City of 
Mapleton had not approved Lot 67 for building and construction. 
30. Consequently, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve knew that their representations 
were false. 
31. Alternatively, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made such representations 
recklessly, knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representations. 
32. Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made the aforementioned representations to Mr. 
Aviano, with respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, for the purpose of inducing Mr. Aviano to 
purchase Lot 67. 
33. Mr. Aviano, acting reasonably upon and in ignorance of the false representations 
made by Mr. Simpson and The Preserve, with respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, purchased 
Lot 67 for the purpose of building his home thereon, and expended an additional $67,744.52 to 
begin initial improvements on Lot 67, comprised of the following costs: 
a. $37,818.45: PRW Architects; 
b. $8,792.50: RB&G Engineering; 
c. $5,970.13: Clyve Roundy Construction; 
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d. $14,338.44: Equine Facilities Architects; and 
e. $825: Interior Design Consultant. 
34. Subsequently, on April 13, 2009, the City of Mapleton's Planning Director, Cory 
Branch, informed Mr. Aviano that the City would not issue a building permit for Lot 67 as the 
only preliminary work that had been completed with respect to the entire subdivision, including 
Lot 67, consisted solely of a recorded subdivision plat. See, Letter dated April 13, 2009 from 
Mapleton City Corporation, attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
35. The Planning Director further informed Mr. Aviano that the entire subdivision, 
including Lot 67, had not yet been serviced by completed improvements for culinary water 
mains, water service lines, street improvements, sewer mains, and sewer service lines and, 
therefore, no building permit could be issued. See, Id. 
36. Additionally, the Planning Director informed Mr. Aviano that the City of 
Mapleton required a completed debris basin for the entire subdivision, including Lot 67, and that 
said debris basin was not completed. See, Id. 
37. In addition to the expenses set forth in Paragraph 33, above, Mr. Aviano has also 
been required to pay, and continues to accrue, applicable property taxes for property that is 
essentially useless, i.e., Lot 67, as follows: 
a. $10,773.95 for 2008; and 
b. $5,913.92 for 2009. 
/// 
[ CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE ] 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Failure to Release Security Interest {Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38, et seq.) 
Navona,LC 
38. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
39. On or about December 6, 2007, Mr. Aviano, as Trustee of the Michael W. Aviano 
Trust, purchased Lot 67 from The Preserve. See, Warranty Deed, attached to Plaintiffs Second 
Amended Complaint as Exhibit 145. 
40. Pursuant to the agreement for the sale and purchase of Lot 67, the entity holding 
the first mortgage on the property, MagnetBank/Navona, agreed to release its security interest in 
Lot 67 upon the receipt of $897,773.00. See, Settlement Statement, attached as Exhibit 143 to 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. See also, Exhibits "A" and "B", hereto. 
41. MagnetBank/Navona received $897,773.00 from the proceeds of the sale of Lot 
67. See, Id. See also, Second Amended Complaint, \410. See also, Exhibit "B", hereto.-
42. ) Notwithstanding the fact that MagnetBank/Navona received $897,773.00 from the 
proceeds of the sale of Lot 67, MagnetBank/Navona refuses to release its security interest in Lot 
67. See, Second Amended Complaint, f 410. 
43. Mr. Aviano has sent written demand to MagnetBank/Navona for the immediate 
release of MagnetBank/Navona's security interest in Lot 67, but MagnetBank/Navona still 
refuses to release its security interest in Lot 67. See, Exhibit "C", hereto. 
44. Mr. Aviano has been damaged by MagnetBank/Navona's refusal to release its 
security interest in Lot 67. 
45. Specifically, Mr. Aviano personally paid $575,000.00 towards the purchase price 
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of Lot 67, and has expended an additional $84,432.39 to improve Lot 67, as set forth in 
Paragraphs 33 and 37 above, but is unable to sell, convey, mortgage, or otherwise benefit from 
Lot 67 because of MagnetBank/Navona's recorded security interest thereon. 
46. Moreover, Mr. Aviano has incurred, and continues to incur, legal expenses in 
bringing this action against the Counterclaim Defendants. 
47. Consequently, Navona is liable to Mr. Aviano, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-38, et seq., for failing to release its security interest in Lot 67, in an amount to be proved at 
trial, but in no event less than the greater of $1,000.00 or treble actual damages, totaling 
$1,978,297.17, in addition to all expenses incurred in enforcing this action against Navona, in 
addition to reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Slander of Title 
Navona, LC 
48. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
49. By failing to release its security interest in Lot 67, as recorded in the official 
records of the Utah County Recorder, Navona has published a slanderous statement disparaging 
Mr. Aviano's title thereto, indicating encumbrances on Lot 67 which do not actually or lawfully 
exist. 
50. Because Mr. Aviano is the rightful owner of Lot 67, free and clear of Navona's 
security interest, any recording in the official records of the Utah County Recorder to the 
contrary, including Navona's recorded security interest, are false. 
51. Navona has acted maliciously, wrongfully, knowingly, and intentionally in 
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refusing to release its security interest in Lot 67, which has now cast a false or misleading 
impression that such security interest actually exists, when, in fact, it does not. 
52. Such false or misleading impressions are adverse to Mr. Aviano's ownership of 
Lot 67, and under the circumstances, Navona should have reasonably foreseen that such false or 
misleading impressions would result in damage to Mr. Aviano. 
53. Mr. Aviano has been damaged by MagnetBank/Navona's refusal to release its 
security interest in Lot 67. 
54. Specifically, Mr. Aviano personally paid $575,000.00 towards the purchase price 
of Lot 67 and is unable to sell, convey, or mortgage Lot 67 because of MagnetBank/Navona's 
recorded security interest thereon. 
55. Furthermore, Mr. Aviano has expended an additional $84,432.39 in attempting to 
improve Lot 67, as set forth in Paragraphs 33 and 37, above, but has been unable to realize the 
fruits thereof because of MagnetBank/Navona's security interest thereon. 
56. Moreover, Mr. Aviano has incurred, and continues to incur, legal expenses in 
bringing this action against the Counterclaim Defendants. 
57. Consequently, Navona is liable to Mr. Aviano for Navona's slander of Mr. 
Aviano's title to Lot 67 in an amount to be determined at trial, in addition to punitive damages. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Unjust Enrichment 
Navona, LC 
58. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
59. Navona has been unjustly enriched by Mr. Aviano. 
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60. Specifically, Mr. Aviano conferred a benefit upon Navona by ensuring that 
Navona, as successor-in-interest to MagnetBank, received $897,773.00 from the proceeds of the 
sale of Lot 67, $575,000.00 of which Mr. Aviano paid personally. 
61. Moreover, Mr. Aviano has further conferred a benefit upon Navona by improving 
and maintaining Lot 67, upon which Navona claims a security interest, in the amount of 
$84,432.39, as set forth in Paragraphs 33 and 37, above. 
62. Navona appreciates and has a knowledge of said benefit conferred upon it by Mr. 
Aviano, as evidenced by Navona's own admissions. See, inter alia, Second Amended Complaint, 
%410. 
63. Navona has accepted and retained said benefit, and under the circumstances of 
this case (i.e., failing to release its security interest in Lot 67 despite having received the 
$897,773.00 it agreed to receive in exchange for releasing its security interest in Lot 67), it 
would be inequitable for Navona to continue to retain such benefit without the payment of its 
value to Mr. Aviano. 
64. Mr. Aviano has been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial, but in no event 
less than $659,432.39, as set forth in Paragraphs 60 and 61, above, as well as by incurring 
applicable costs and attorneys' fees in bringing this action against Navona. 
65. Navona, therefore, has been unjustly enriched by Mr. Aviano, and Mr. Aviano has 
been damaged thereby in an amount to be proved at trial, but in no event less than $659,432.39, 
plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees. 
/// 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breaches of Oral Contracts 
Leslie D. Mower and Navona, LC 
66. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
67. Mr. Aviano entered into valid oral agreements with both Ms. Mower personally, 
andNavona. 
68. Specifically, Ms. Mower met with Mr. Aviano on at least five (5) separate 
occasions and personally offered to repay Mr. Aviano for any money which he paid towards the 
purchase price of Lot 67, as well as any other costs or fees subsequently incurred by Mr. Aviano 
with respect to Lot 67, in exchange for Mr. Aviano's agreement not to require 
MagnetBank/Navona to release its security interest in Lot 67 and Mr. Aviano's agreement to 
postpone any further improvements of Lot 67. 
69. Mr. Aviano accepted Ms. Mower's offer to repay the $575,000.00, as well as 
subsequently incurred costs as set forth in Paragraphs 33 and 37, above, instead of requiring 
MagnetBank/Navona to release its security interest in Lot 67. 
70. Mr. Aviano has fully performed each of his obligations under the oral agreement 
with Ms. Mower, as set forth in Paragraphs 67 through 69, above, by postponing any additional 
improvements upon Lot 67, and by not attempting to further force Navona to release its security 
interest in Lot 67, until Ms. Mower materially breached the oral agreement. 
71. Ms. Mower has materially breached her oral agreement with Mr. Aviano by 
failing to repay $575,000.00 of the purchase price personally paid by Mr. Aviano towards Lot 
67, as well as subsequently incurred costs. 
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72. Mr. Aviano has been damaged as a result of Ms. Mower's breach in the amount of 
$659,432.39, and by incurring applicable costs and attorneys' fees in bringing this action against 
said Counterclaim Defendants. 
73. Furthermore, Navona's counsel also met with Mr. Aviano and offered, on behalf 
of his client, to repay Mr. Aviano any amount which Mr. Aviano had personally paid towards the 
purchase of Lot 67 within a few weeks, instead of requiring MagnetBank/Navona to release its 
security interest in Lot 67 and Mr. Aviano's agreement to postpone any further improvements of 
Lot 67. 
74. Mr. Aviano accepted Navona's offer to repay the $575,000.00 which Mr. Aviano 
had personally paid towards the purchase of Lot 67, instead of requiring MagnetBank/Navona to 
release its security interest in Lot 67. 
75. Mr. Aviano has fully performed each of his obligations under the oral agreement 
with Navona, as set forth in Paragraphs 73 through 74, above, by postponing any additional 
improvements upon Lot 67, and by not attempting to further force Navona to release its security 
interest in Lot 67, until Ms. Mower materially breached the oral agreement. 
76. Navona has materially breached its oral agreement with Mr. Aviano by failing to 
repay $575,000.00 of the purchase price personally paid by Mr. Aviano towards Lot 67. 
77. Mr. Aviano has been damaged as a result of Navona's breach in the amount of 
$575,000.00, and by incurring applicable costs and attorneys' fees in bringing this action against 
said Counterclaim Defendants. 
78. Consequently, Ms. Mower is liable to Mr. Aviano for her breach of contract in an 
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attorneys'fees. 
79. Navona is liable to Mr. Aviano for its breache of contract in an amount to be 
proved at trial, but in no event less than $575,000.00, plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Leslie D. Mower and Navona, LC 
80. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
81. Every contract in Utah, including the oral agreement between Ms. Mower and Mr. 
Aviano, and the oral agreement between Navona and Mr. Aviano, is subject to an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
82. Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party, including the 
Counterclaim Defendants in their respective oral agreements, impliedly promises that he or she 
will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right 
to receive the fruits of the contract. 
83. By Ms. Mower's and Navona's respective failures to comply with the express 
contractual provisions of their respective oral agreements with Mr. Aviano, as set forth in 
Paragraphs 66 through 79, above, namely Ms. Mower's $659,432.39 payment obligation, and 
Navona's $575,000.00 payment obligation, the Counterclaim Defendants have intentionally or 
purposely destroyed and injured Mr. Aviano's right to receive the fruits of those oral agreements. 
84. Mr. Aviano has been damaged as a result of the Counterclaim Defendants' 
various breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the amount of $659,432.39, 
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Defendants. 
85. Consequently, Ms. Mower and Navona are liable to Mr. Aviano for their 
respective breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to their respective 
oral agreements with Mr. Aviano, in an amount to be proved at trial, but in no event less than 
$659,432.39, plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Unjust Enrichment 
Leslie D. Mower and Navona, LC 
86. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
87. In the event the Court does not find damages pursuant to the respective oral 
agreement between Ms. Mower and Mr. Aviano, and between Navona and Mr. Aviano, Mr. 
Aviano alleges, in the alternative to its breaches of contracts claims, that the Counterclaim 
Defendants have each been unjustly enriched by Mr. Aviano. 
88. Specifically, Mr. Aviano conferred various benefits upon Ms. Mower and Navona 
pursuant to the respective oral agreements between Ms. Mower and Mr. Aviano, and between 
Navona and Mr. Aviano, by, inter alia, postponing any further improvements on Lot 67 and by 
not forcing Navona to release its security interest in Lot 67. 
89. Ms. Mower and Navona appreciate and have a knowledge of such benefits 
conferred by Mr. Aviano by, inter alia, not having to release Navona's security interest in Lot 
67. 
90. Ms. Mower and Navona have accepted and retained said benefits, and under the 
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to retain such benefits without the payment of their value to Mr. Aviano. 
91. Therefore, Ms. Mower and Navona have been unjustly enriched, and Mr. Aviano 
has been damaged thereby in an amount to be proved at trial, but in no event less than 
$659,432.39, plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action against 
Ms. Mower and Navona. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Fraud 
David Simpson and The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC 
92. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. * 
93. In connection with the sale and purchase of Lot 67, on or about December 5, 
2007, Mr. Simpson, personally, and The Preserve specifically represented to Mr. Aviano that all 
of the preliminary work had been completed with respect to Lot 67 and its subdivision, such that 
the City had approved the entire subdivision, including Lot 67, for building and construction, and 
that Mr. Aviano would be able to immediately obtain the requisite building permit and 
commence construction immediately after purchasing the lot. 
94. In fact, however, the subdivision, including Lot 67, had not been approved for 
building or construction by the City of Mapleton, the State of Utah, nor any other applicable 
governmental or regulatory entity. See, Exhibit "D ", hereto. 
95. At the time Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made these representations with 
respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve knew that neither the 
City of Mapleton or the State of Utah, nor any other applicable governmental or regulatory 
entity, had approved Lot 67 for building and construction, and Mr. Simpson and The Preserve Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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made such representations willfully, maliciously, intentionally, and fraudulently. See, Id. 
96. Consequently, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve knew that their representations 
were false. See, Id. 
97. Alternatively, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made such representations 
recklessly, knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representations. 
98. Mr. Simpson and The Preserve made the aforementioned representations to Mr. 
Aviano, with respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, for the purpose of inducing Mr. Aviano to 
purchase Lot 67. 
99. Mr. Aviano, acting reasonably upon and in ignorance of the false representations 
made by Mr. Simpson and The Preserve with respect to the ability to build on Lot 67, purchased 
Lot 67 for $900,000.00, $575,000.00 of which Mr. Aviano paid personally, with the intent to 
construct a house thereon. 
100. Mr. Aviano also spent an additional $67,744.52 to begin initial improvements on 
Lot 67, comprised of the following costs: 
a. $37,818.45: PRW Architects; 
b. $8,792.50: RB&G Engineering; 
c. $5,970.13: ClyveRoundy Construction; 
d. $14,338.44: Equine Facilities Architects; and 
e. $825: Carol, Interior Design Consultant. 
101. Subsequently, on April 13, 2009, the City of Mapleton's Planning Director, Cory 
Branch, informed Mr. Aviano that the City would not issue a building permit for Lot 67 as the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reu en Clark Law School, BYU. 
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only preliminary work that had been completed with respect to the entire subdivision, including 
Lot 67, consisted solely of a recorded subdivision plat. See, Exhibit "D", hereto. 
102. The Planning Director further informed Mr. Aviano that the entire subdivision, 
including Lot 67, had not yet been serviced by completed improvements for culinary water 
mains, water service lines, street improvements, sewer mains, and sewer service lines and, 
therefore, no building permit could be issued. See, Id. 
103. Additionally, the Planning Director informed Mr. Aviano that the City of 
Mapleton required a completed debris basin for the entire subdivision, including Lot 67, and that 
said debris basin was not completed. See, Id. 
104. In addition to the expenses set forth in Paragraph 100, above, Mr. Aviano has also 
been required to pay, and continues to accrue, applicable property taxes for property that is 
essentially useless, i.e., Lot 67, as follows: 
a. $10,773.95 for 2008; and 
b. $5,913.92 for 2009. 
105. Consequently, Mr. Aviano has been damaged as a result of Mr. Simpson's and 
The Preserve fraudulent acts, comprised of knowingly making false statements with respect to 
Mr. Aviano's ability to immediately begin building on Lot 67 and the necessary preliminary 
work that had allegedly been completed, for the purpose of inducing Mr. Aviano to purchase Lot 
67. 
106. Specifically, Mr. Aviano purchased Lot 67, based upon Mr. Simpson's and The 
Preserve's fraudulent misrepresentations, for the purpose of building his home thereon, which he 
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107. Consequently, Mr. Aviano has paid $575,000.00 towards the $900,000.00 
purchase price of a piece of real property which is essentially useless. 
108. Additionally, Mr. Aviano has incurred an additional $84,432.39 in expenses, as 
set forth in Paragraphs 100 and 104, above, based upon Mr. Simpson's and The Preserve's 
fraudulent misrepresentations. 
109. Furthermore, Mr. Aviano has incurred, and continues to incur, legal expenses in 
bringing this action against said Cross-Claim Defendants. 
110. Therefore, Mr. Simpson and The Preserve are jointly and severally liable to Mr. 
Aviano for the fraudulent misrepresentations made by Mr. Simpson and The Preserve, in an 
amount to be proven at trial, but in no event less than $659,432.39, plus applicable costs and 
attorneys' fees, in addition to punitive damages. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Warranty Deed 
The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC 
111. Mr. Aviano incorporates herein by reference and realleges each of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
112. On or about December 6, 2007, Mr. Aviano, as Trustee of the Michael W. Aviano 
Trust, purchased Lot 67 from The Preserve, for the purpose of building his home thereon. 
113. The Preserve conveyed Lot 67 to Mr. Aviano via a general Warranty Deed. See, 
Warranty Deed, attached to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as Exhibit 145, 
114. Pursuant to the aforementioned Warranty Deed, The Preserve made, inter alia, the 
following covenants of title with Mr. Aviano : 
a. the covenant of seisin; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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b. the covenant of right to convey; 
c. the covenant against encumbrances; 
d. the covenant of quiet possession; and 
e. the covenant of general warranty. 
115. The Preserve has breached the Warranty Deed's covenant against encumbrances 
and covenant of quiet possession by failing to obtain a release of MagnetBank/Navona's security 
interest in Lot 67, which injuriously affects the value of Lot 67 and constitutes a burden and 
limitation on Mr. Aviano. 
116. The Preserve may have already breached, or may soon be in breach of, additional 
covenants made pursuant to the Warranty Deed. 
117. Mr. Aviano has been damaged by The Preserve's breaches by having to incur, and 
continuing to incur, applicable costs and attorneys' fees in litigating the matter with 
MagnetBank/Navona. 
118. Consequently, The Preserve is liable to Mr. Aviano for said costs and legal fees as 
a result of The Preserve's breaches of various covenants made pursuant to the Warranty Deed, in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Aviano respectfully requests that the Court grant the following 
relief: 
On Mr, Aviano's First Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Navona has wrongfully and unlawfully 
refused to release its security interest in Lot 67, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38, et seq., 
and releasing Navona's security interest in Lot 67. 
550$ 
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2. For a determination by the Court and a Judgment against Navona as to the amount 
of damages suffered by Mr. Aviano as a result of Navona's refusal to release its security interest 
in Lot 67, but in no event less than the greater of $1,000.00 or treble actual damages, but not less 
than $1,978,297.17, including all expenses incurred in enforcing this action against Navona, in 
addition to reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38, et 
seq. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Second Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Navona is liable to Mr. Aviano for the 
slander of Mr. Aviano's title to Lot 67. 
2. For a determination by the Court and a Judgment against Navona as to the amount 
of damages suffered by Mr. Aviano as a result of Navona's slander of Mr. Aviano's title to Lot 
67, as proved at trial, but in no event less than $659,432.39, plus applicable costs and attorneys' 
fees incurred by Mr. Aviano in bringing this law suit. 
3. For punitive damages in the sum of $ 1,000,000.00. 
4. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Third Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Navona is liable to Mr. Aviano for unjust 
enrichment of the amount paid by Mr. Aviano towards the purchase price of Lot 67, as well as all 
amounts expended in the improvement or maintenance thereof. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. For a determination and Judgment against Navona in an amount determined by 
the Court that is reasonable to cure die unjust enrichment of Navona, but in no event shall such 
amount be less than $659,432.39, plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by Mr. 
Aviano in bringing this law suit. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Fourth Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Ms. Mower and Navona are both in 
breach of their respective oral agreements with Mr. Aviano. 
2. For a Judgment against said Defendants, for such breaches in an amount to be 
determined at trial, but in no event shall such amount be less than $659,432.39, plus applicable 
costs and attorneys'fees. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Fifth Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Ms. Mower and Navona are both in 
breach of their respective oral agreement with Mr. Aviano, for having breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing therein. 
2. For a Judgment against said Defendants for such breaches in an amount to be 
determined at trial, but in no event shall such amount be less than $659,432.39, plus applicable 
costs and attorneys'fees. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under Digitized by the Howa d W. Hunte  Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Sixth Cause of Action; 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that Ms. Mower and Navona are each liable to 
Mr. Aviano for unjust enrichment pursuant to each of their respective nonperformances under 
their respective oral agreements with Mr. Aviano. 
2. For a determination and Judgment against Ms. Mower and Navona, in an amount 
determined by the Court that is reasonable to cure the respective unjust enrichment of each 
Counterclaim Defendant, but in no event shall such amount be less than $659,432.39, plus 
applicable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by Mr. Aviano in bringing this law suit. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Seventh Cause of Action: 
1. For a Judgment against Mr. Simpson and The Preserve, jointly and severally, for 
their fraudulent misrepresentations in an amount to be proved at trial, but in no event shall such 
amount be less than $659,432.39, plus applicable costs and attorneys' fees. 
2. For punitive damages in the sum of $ 1,000,000.00. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
On Mr. Aviano's Eighth Cause of Action: 
1. For an Order of the Court declaring that The Preserve is in breach of the Warranty 
Deed between The Preserve and Mr. Aviano. 
2. For a Judgment against said The Preserve for its breaches in an amount to be Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
detemiined at trial, but in no event shall such amount be less than the costs and legal fees 
incurred by Mr. Aviano as a result of The Preserve's breaches of various covenants made 
pursuant to the Warranty Deed, in an amount to be determined at trial. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
For All Causes of Action: 
1. An award of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this lawsuit, costs and 
expenses of suit, pre-judgment interest as allowed by law, and such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this Pfe- day of /KA/JbiA , 2010. Mmj 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
i ^ -MARK(D. EDDY 
MORGAN L. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Michael W. Aviano 
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M a g n e t B a nk 
Jril Gbnstensen 
101 North University Ave 
Pfovo.UT 84601 
Subject: Lot Release Price for Lot 67 
Dear Jill: 
As you have requested, we are herein providing a pay-off quote for Lot 67 of The Preserve at 
Mapleton Subdivision. 
The release price for this individual Jot is equai to the net proceeds of that lot. 
Net Proceeds is defined below: 
"means, wtth respect to the sate of any Lot, the greater of (i) the amount of cash 
received by Borrower for such Lot plus the fair market value in cash of any non-
cash consideration realized from such sale after deduction of any escrow, 
closing, recording and titte insurance costs paid by Borrower in connection 
therewith, or (it) the sum of cash received by Borrower plus the fair market value 
in cash of any non-cash eortsideration realized from svch sale." 
Ptease send fully executed HUD to Brian Webster at bwebster@magnetbank.net and wire funds 
directly to MagnetBank as noted below: 
SunTrust Bank 
ABA #-061000104 
For Credit to: The Preserve at Mapleton 
Account Earner MagnetBank 
Account Number: 1000025217091 
Attn: (Loan Operations} 
Note; Lot 67t Preserve at Mapletcn Subdivision, Loan #101047 
Wire funds will be credited as of the date actually received by MagnetBank. 
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CENTRAL BANK 
STANDARD WIRE TRANSFER REQUEST FORM 
DAT t 1 2 / 7 / 0 ? W I W 3 : 
AMOUNT: 897,773.00 
BANK NAME: SunTrust Bank 
ADDRESS. 
CITY: STATE: 
ROUTING AND TRANSIT § (ABA): 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 Q 4 
ORIGINATOR: Pro-TIU8 and Escrow. Inc. 
ORIG ADDRESS- 1 ° 1 N ° r t h U n , v e r 8 , tyA v e- P r o v 0 ' u t a h &46Qi 
ORIG. TAX ID #: S7"649^507 
1000025217091 BENEFICIARY ACCOUNT ± 
_ c _ c t A O V _ MagnetBank For Credit to: The Preserve at Mapleton 
.D t i> t r iL, 1 AJ\. Y IN A lvj LL'. 
BENEFICIARY ADDRESS: 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: L ° 3 n °***«™ Lot 6 7 ' P r e s e r v e a t M a P , e , o n S u b ' L o a n * 1 0 1 0 4 7 
ACCOUNT ff TO BE CHARGED: 6 1 1 1 0 7 3 0 NON CUST/CK SYSTEMS INQ/OFAC: 
TOTAL AMOUNT ACCOUNT WILL BE CHARGED: DEBIT MEMO: 
WIRE FEE: CHARGE: WAIVE: 
HOW REQUEST RECEIVED: PERSON: PHONE: FAX/LETTER: 
CALL BACK ON WIRE REQUESTED BY PHDNETAX/LETTER: 
PERSON CONTACTED: DATE: TIME: 
OFRCEREQUESTING WIRE: ORDERED BY. 
VERIFIED WITH: S^))(Ln£, TIME: ) J \ ftQlNITIALS y, LL. 
OFFICER AUTHORIZATION: 
CUSTOMER AUTHORIZATION: MMA/L. DATE: lA/T/Q 
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AilUKJNJtYb 
233 SOUTH PLEASANT GROVE BLVD.. SUITE 202 
PLEASANT GROVE, UTAH 84062 
TELEPHONE (801) 443-2380 
FACSIMILE (801) 7960984 
! TUCKER" HANSEN 
r L WRIGHT 
: D. EDDY 
! K. HAWS 
SAK. MELLOR 
D. JARVIS 
THY G. MERRILL 
AlE D. MERRITT 
April 14, 2009 
Mr. William T. Jennings 
Bailey &. Jennings, LC 
584 S. State Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Re: Lot 67 - The Preserve at Maple ton Subdivision 
Dear Mr. Jennings, 
I represent Michael Aviano, the owner of Lot 67 of The Preserve at Mapleton. I am in 
possession of letters exchanged between you and Mr. Garrett Wilson at ProTitle and Escrow, Inc. 
along with a payoff statement, closing documents and other materials evidencing the loan payoff to 
Magnet Bank in December of 2007. I also noticed from your letter that you represent the 
successor in interest to the Magnet Bank loan on The Preserve at Mapleton project. If I 
jnderstand your letter correctly, your client purchased the underlying Note and Trust Deed on 
February 26, 2008, after the loan payoff was received by Magnet Bank on my client's lot. 
Notwithstanding Pro-Title's efforts to convince your client to reconvey, or to allow it to 
lo so under its statutory authority, your client has refused to do so. Again, my review of the ample 
locumentation and the wire confirmation regarding Lot 67 show that payment has been received 
md that there would be no way of proving any differently. If you possess any evidence to the 
:ontrary, please make the same available to me at your earliest convenience. If not, your client has 
en (10) days within which to file the reconveyance or I will instruct my client to bring action 
)ursuant to Utah Code Annotated 57*1-38 et. seq. I will also be seeking the attorney's fees and 
>ther costs associated with this action. 
Sincerely, 
HANSEN WRIGHT/QDDY & HAWS 
/ MARK D.EDDY 
Attorney at Law 
IDE/sd 
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MAPLETON CITY CORPORATION 
April 13, 2009 
Mike Aviano 
1229 Town & Country Road 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Re: Building Permit /W586-NH - The Preserve at Mapleton Subdivision, Plat "A" {Lot 67) - 1331 
East Little Canyon Court 
Dear Mr. Aviano, 
This letter will serve as a follow-up to our recent conversation regarding the status of your building 
permit. As per our conversation you have requested that the permit be issued, based on the fact that the 
subdivision (The Preserve at Mapleton Subdivision, Plat "A") plat has been recorded. Maplelon City 
Code Section 18.84.390, Minimum Level Of Improvements To Be Installed Before Building Permits May 
Be Issued, cites that no building permit may be issued unless and until the lot is serviced by completed 
improvements for culinary water mam, water service line, street improvements, sewer main, and sewer 
service lines. Thus, simply recording a subdivision plat does not entitle an owner to issuance of a 
building permit. 
Mapleton City Code Section 18.12.050. Building Permits, Paragraph E5 Grounds for Denying Permit, 
states 'The city shall have complete discretion to grant or deny a permits As discussed in our earlier 
conversation Mapleton City is concerned with the current status of the subdivision improvements, 
especially as it relates to the proposed debris basin. As of today's date the basin has not been completed 
and in recent months conflicts have surfaced regarding ownership of the basin. 
In short, the purpose of this letter is to emphasize that Mapleton City is prepared to review your proposed 
building permit once the ownership of the proposed basin has been resolved, a debris bar»m-drainage 
easement has been found acceptable by Mapleton City and recorded at the Utah Count)' Recorders Office, 
and the debris basin has been constructed and approved by Mapleton City. Once the above issues have 
been resolved Mapleton City will review the proposed plan and determine if it meets the requirements of 
the Mapleton City Code. 
If you have any further questions, please contact me at (801) 806-9101, or cbranch@mapIeton.org. 
Sincerely, 
MAPLETON CITY CORPORATION 
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